Tag Archives: wall street

Multinational Corporations and the American Commons

Harvard Business School recently launched what it’s calling the US Competitiveness Project, which is “a research-led effort to understand and improve the competitiveness of the United States.” To publicize this effort, Harvard Magazine just published a series of interviews with some of the professors involved. I don’t normally like reading interviews, because they tend to have a ridiculously high length to content ratio, but these were quite dense in content, and I recommend the whole set of interviews as important reading for anyone interested in the state of US business or multinational corporations operate.

The interviews ran to almost 20 magazine pages, so I won’t even try to summarize them. But I will note a recurring theme, which was about American companies investing in America. The professors called this America’s “business commons,” which they defined as “a skilled workforce, an educated populace, vibrant local suppliers, basic rule of law, and so on.” They pointed out that “historically, American businesses invested in these resources deeply, and that helped to build many of America’s strengths.”

Copyright 2012 Thoughtbasket

Interestingly, the professors went back and forth between reasons to support America’s business commons, from what I call “hard” reasons (those that drive profitability) to “soft” reasons (patriotic calls to support America).

Hard reasons included:

  • Outsourcing calculations often overestimate cost savings
  • Local manufacturing can drive product and process improvements
  • For most multinationals, the US still makes up the majority of their business

Soft reasons were more vague, with a desire of “many in the business community to roll up their sleeves and do things in their communities” being a typical statement. Michael Porter (a giant in the strategy and competition fields) and Jan Rivkin define US competitiveness as including “raising the living standards of the average American.”

This all raises an interesting dilemma. If the role of corporate executives is to maximize returns to shareholders (this is how most US managers operate, although there is in fact disagreement regarding shareholder v. stakeholder approaches: read relevant articles here, here, here and here) then they shouldn’t care whether they build America’s business commons or China’s business commons or any other business commons, except to the extent that any given commons supports their business. In other words, if Jeff Immelt at GE thinks that investing in China’s educational system will generate higher returns than investing in America’s, that is what he should do.

However, I suspect that most executives at big US companies would feel uncomfortable with that. Since most of them were born in the US, raised in the US, and live in the US, there is probably some part of them that feels a loyalty to the US, that wants to build America’s commons even if building China’s commons has a higher ROI. How do these CEOs reconcile their duties to shareholders with their inherent patriotism? I don’t know. The professors in the US Competitiveness Project would suggest that the disconnect is not as great as many think; that building the US commons DOES have a high ROI. But based on my reading, it sounds like they would also give executives permission to foreground their patriotism over pure shareholder analysis, at least on borderline cases.

In addition to Michael Porter and Jan Rivkin, other professors interviewed included Willy Shih, Rossbeth Kanter and Thomas Kochan (who actually teaches at MIT, not Harvard).

Matt Taibbi on Romney and Private Equity

Matt Taibbi has a new piece in Rolling Stone about Mitt Romney’s time at Bain Capital, and how Bain used large amounts of debt to execute its buyouts. The overall theme is one of financial engineering vs. making things, of pillaging companies to generate wealth vs. building companies to create jobs.

Like most things Taibbi writes, this article is:

  1. Very funny
  2. Savagely mean
  3. Only about 75% accurate, and you need to know a lot about Wall Street to know which quarter is wrong

However, in light of my prior post on private equity, there are two paragraphs that I wanted to quote because they are both amusing and apt.

Talking about the private equity model of loading up a company with debt and then paying fees and dividends to the buyout firm, Taibbi says:

This business model wasn’t really “helping,” of course – and it wasn’t new. Fans of mob movies will recognize what’s known as the “bust-out,” in which a gangster takes over a restaurant or sporting goods store and then monetizes his investment by running up giant debts on the company’s credit line. (Think Paulie buying all those cases of Cutty Sark in Goodfellas.) When the note comes due, the mobster simply torches the restaurant and collects the insurance money. Reduced to their most basic level, the leveraged buyouts engineered by Romney followed exactly the same business model. “It’s the bust-out,” one Wall Street trader says with a laugh. “That’s all it is.”

And then, comparing Romney’s speeches decrying America’s level of debt with his Bain Capital strategy of loading up companies with debt, Taibbi writes:

To recap: Romney, who has compared the devilish federal debt to a “nightmare” home mortgage that is “adjustable, no-money down and assigned to our children,” took over Ampad with essentially no money down, saddled the firm with a nightmare debt and assigned the crushing interest payments not to Bain but to the children of Ampad’s workers, who would be left holding the note long after Romney fled the scene. The mortgage analogy is so obvious, in fact, that even Romney himself has made it. He once described Bain’s debt-fueled strategy as “using the equivalent of a mortgage to leverage up our investment.”

I like that one because it makes the connection between private equity and mortgages, as I did in my post.

Again, I’m not fully supporting Taibbi’s reporting or his conclusions, but he makes some good points.

Marc Andreesen Finally Calls The Tech Bubble

After months of saying, contrary to all evidence, (like this, this and this) that there was not a tech bubble going on, super-VC Marc Andreesen has finally publicly pulled back from investing because valuations are too high. Duh.

On Wall Street and Self-Regulation

Matt Taibbi has a new piece in Rolling Stone, using Senator Levin’s report on the financial meltdown to show that Goldman Sachs broke the law repeatedly. You have to take Taibbi with a grain of salt, especially when it comes to Goldman (here is the NY Times on the same report), but here is a stunning fact pattern on how prosecutions of financial crimes have gone steeply downhill in the past 20 years:

William Black was senior deputy chief counsel at the Office of Thrift Supervision in 1991 and 1992…. Black describes the regulatory MO back then. “Every year,” he says, “you had thousands of criminal referrals, maybe 500 enforcement actions, 150 civil suits and hundreds of convictions.”

But beginning in the mid-Nineties, when former Goldman co-chairman Bob Rubin served as Bill Clinton’s senior economic-policy adviser, the government began moving toward a regulatory system that relied almost exclusively on voluntary compliance by the banks. Old-school criminal referrals disappeared down the chute of history along with floppy disks and scripted television entertainment. In 1995, according to an independent study, banking regulators filed 1,837 referrals. During the height of the financial crisis, between 2007 and 2010, they averaged just 72 a year.

Ditto

See yesterday’s post, and repeat. Names change, facts remain the same.

Fed Lends Millions to Well-Connected Wives

This story is by Matt Taibbi, so you should expect some hyperbole, but the basic facts are that two well-connected Wall Street wives, with no financial experience, managed to get $220 million in low interest loans from the Fed. They then invested the money in higher yielding securities, essentially minting money on the spread. And they still haven’t paid back $150 million of their loan.

Joe Stiglitz on Income Inequality

He’s a Nobel Prize winner, so he must be smart.

Read his article here.

Links to Great Articles

Yves Smith on the macro effects of oversized Wall Street pay.

I normally don’t love Paul Krugman, despite his Nobel Prize, since he is too strident and preachy and predictable, but this take on what really separates Right from Left in America is pretty interesting.

John Mearsheimer on American foreign policy and realpolitik.

John Cassidy on whether Wall Street adds value to society. Hint: it doesn’t. This is from the New Yorker, so it won’t be available online forever.

Law professor David Beatty compares American constitutional jurisprudence to how they do it in other countries. I’m no expert, but I found it fascinating.

Income Inequality; Rise of Wacky Politicians

Here are links to two long and thoughtful articles worth reading.

The first is Timothy Noah’s ten-part (yes, 10!) piece in Slate on income inequality in America. He explores all the possible causes, in a non-ideological way, and then discusses why it all matters. Among the factors at play: taxes, overseas manufacturing, lobbyists and Wall Street. Check out this graph below to see how the share of the top 10% has grown over the last 40 years.

The second article is Matt Bai’s piece in the NY Times about Linda McMahon’s campaign for senator of  Connecticut. Bai explores how a staid, preppy state like Connecticut could possibly elect a cartoonish figure like McMahon, who based on her public statements seems utterly unqualified to be senator. He discusses the long-term trends, including white flight and the loss of industry, which lead to young adults leaving the state and public sector unions gaining power, which leads to a weakening of the traditional political system, which leads to wrestling impresarios running for senate. It’s a long article, but nuanced and thoughtful and well worth reading.

The Myth of the Sophisticated Investor

This article in The Big Money discusses how Goldman Sachs’ defense in the Abacus CDO case – that the buyers were sophisticated investors – isn’t entirely accurate, since those sophisticated investors (banks and pension funds) get a significant amount of money from regular folks like you and me. This is true, but it only gets at half the story. In the context of Wall Street, banks and pension funds are not considered the most sophisticated players.

The reality is that Wall Street has a hierarchy, and it’s measured by compensation. Generally speaking, the smartest people go to where they can make the most money. So if you are really sharp, you’re not likely to end up managing a pension fund’s investments and being a civil servant making $200k per year. You might settle for being a bond portfolio manger at a bank, making $500k. But if you are really smart and aggressive – in other words, a sophisticated player – you are going to end up at an investment bank putting together deals that can pay you several million dollars per year.

So Goldman’s “these were big boys” defense has two flaws. One, as The Big Money points out, the big boys got their money from the little guys. But two, the buyers may have been big boys, but the Goldman bankers pushing the CDOs were men. Speaking metaphorically, of course.